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THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT ICSID ARBITRATOR DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN
AMERICA
By
Nora Ciancio*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November and December 2013, tribunals constituted under the Rules of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) considered three
proposals for arbitrator disqualification stemming from investment disputes in Latin
America, and ultimately disqualified two arbitrators in pending proceedings. While the
ICSID procedural rules envision challenges to arbitrators, arbitrator disqualification is
traditionally an extremely rare result in ICSID proceedings. Accordingly, it is worth
analyzing whether the recent rise in successful challenges to ICSID arbitrators marks the
beginning of a new adjudicatory trend, and what such a trend may mean for ICSID
arbitration.
Although arbitrator challenges can extend the time until the final disposal of
ICSID cases, thereby counteracting the goal of providing efficient resolution of
investment disputes in the form of arbitration, pursuing more frequent and fully
adjudicated arbitrator challenges may strengthen an otherwise underutilized provision in
the ICSID Rules. An increase in challenges would signal that the procedure adequately
assesses arbitrator qualifications.
Additionally, this growing appearance of
accountability could prove especially beneficial, as ICSID arbitrations remain common
occurrences in Latin America, a region historically skeptical of international forums for
dispute resolution. In part, this skepticism arises from the high rate of claims against
Latin American nations and neutrality concerns associated with repeat arbitrators.
Without state cooperation and support, international investment arbitration will
not succeed. Thus, participants’ perceptions of the forum’s fairness are crucial to the
effectiveness of both ICSID and investor-state arbitration in general. In analyzing the
efficacy of disqualification proceedings in Latin American investment disputes, it is
imperative that scholars and practitioners remain cognizant of Latin America’s perception
of ICSID arbitration as an adjudicatory process. More frequent and fully adjudicated
arbitrator challenges can both signal to participating nations that they have adequate
means of challenging arbitrators, and can also more clearly define ICSID standards of
arbitrator qualifications by interpreting arbitrator independence and impartiality.
II.

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
A. Historically Perceived Inequalities in Arbitration

There is a common argument asserted on behalf of the developing world that
developed countries’ expansion into and exploitation of emerging markets was for the
benefit of affluent foreign investors and inured to the detriment of local businesses and
*
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markets.1 Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America often express that in the course of
arbitrators’ analyses of investment disputes, arbitration fails to address economic and
social issues stemming from the exploitation of colonization by the West in equal balance
with the investors’ legal claims. 2 Developing nations believe both institutional and
doctrinal bias exists in international arbitration,3 and that international arbitration fails to
address the economic and political vulnerability of such regions.4
History has shaped a distrustful picture of arbitration in the eyes of Latin
American countries. In response to European aggression in the 19th century, many Latin
American nations adopted the Calvo Doctrine, which stated that the proper jurisdiction in
international investment disputes lies with the country in which the investment is
located.5 The Calvo Doctrine encouraged countries to require foreign investors and local
entities alike to utilize national courts for redress.6 Latin American countries, specifically,
delayed the ratification of the New York Convention and unanimous ratification did not
occur until 2002. 7 Furthermore, eleven years after ICSID came into force, no Latin
American country had ratified the convention. 8
B. Latin America and ICSID
The developing world has demonstrated similar reservations pertaining
specifically to ICSID proceedings due to the perception that the institution was
1

See Antonius R. Hippolyte, Third World Perspectives on International Economic Governance: A
Theoretical Elucidation of the “Regime Bias” in Investor-State Arbitration and Its Negative Impact on the
Economics of Third World States, 2-4 (June 10, 2012) (unpublished working papers series) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2080958).
2

G. Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover. 12 J. OF INT’L ECON. L., 617, 617(2009) (In
2007, developing countries share of world trade remained at only 37 percent. Most was attributable to only
14 countries, with the remaining 149 developing nations sharing only 7 percent).
3

Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of
Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 424 (2000).
4

See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 25.

5

See id. at 23 (citing ANGHIE A, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
208 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2007); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED
WORLD 50 (Oxford Univ. Press, 4th ed. 1992)).
6

See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Cassese, supra note 5; J.T. GATHII, THIRD WORLD
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD
WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE 261 (Richard Falk et al., 2008)) (explaining that the Calvo doctrine was
established in response to the 19th century European aggression against economically weak Latin American
states and the Calvo doctrine sought to limit the legal and political power of Western countries, whose
actions often led to military and political interference)
7

See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 12.

8

See id.
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established in the interest of wealthy nations and their investors.9 This belief, having built
over time as a result of adverse decisions, has led to waning commitment to both ICSID
and international agreements previously executed by Latin American nations. Suspicion
of ICSID’s bias is exacerbated by the fact that ICSID is part of the World Bank Group,
and thus acts in support of affluent investors from the United States and Western
Europe.10
In explaining the purpose of the ICSID convention, the Report of the Executive
Directors states that in creating ICSID the Executive Directors were “prompted by the
desire to strengthen the partnership between countries in the cause of economic
development” 11 and that “adherence to the Convention by a country would provide
additional inducement and stimulate a larger flow of private international investment in
its territories, which is the primary purpose of the Convention”.12 Despite this expressed
purpose, Latin American nations continue to question the fairness of ICSID proceedings
because of the economic and power disparities among the developed and developing
world. 13 Latin America has repeatedly demonstrated its distrust of ICSID. Initially,
nineteen Latin American countries voted against the adoption of the ICSID convention,
which became known at the “No-de-Tokyo”.14
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American nations began to adopt the
ICSID Convention and entered into numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”).15
This newfound acceptance brought a high number of claims to ICSID. 16 As of 2007,
fifteen percent of concluded matters in ICSID involved claims against Latin American
countries and as of 2010, this percentage skyrocketed to fifty-two percent.17 According
to the first issue of the 2014 Caseload Statistics, twenty-seven percent of all current
ICSID cases arose out of South America, and another seven percent originate in Central
9

Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 605-609 (2012).

10

See id. at 611.

11

Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, ¶ 9 (March 18, 1965).
12

Id. at ¶ 12.

13

See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 3-4.

14

The “No-de-Tokyo” is known in English-speaking discussions as the “Tokyo No”. Ignacio A.
Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 418 (2010).
15

Id. at 420 (citing Stanimir Alexandrov et al., Making Investment Treaties Work for Latin America, ARB.
REV. OF THE AM. 4 (2009), available at
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/13/sections/50/chapters/497/making-investment-treatieswork-latin-america).
16

Id. at 420.

17

Id. at 420 (citing Int’l Ctr. Of Inv. Disputes, List of Pending Cases,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal, (last visited July
7, 2010) (as computed with numbers provided by ICSID)).
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America and the Caribbean.18 Currently, thirty-five percent (66/187) of pending cases
under ICSID concern Latin American nations.19 Although these numbers may be skewed
based on the significant number of disputes caused by the 1998-2002 economic crisis in
Argentina, 20 the statistics still establish the overwhelming presence of Latin American
states in ICSID proceedings.
Even though most Latin America nations eventually came to ratify the ICSID
convention, a renewed resistance to ICSID has cropped up in recent years.21 The wave of
opposition began in April 2007, when the Presidents of Bolivia22, Venezuela23, Cuba, and
Nicaragua announced their intended withdrawal from ICSID.24 Following suit, on May
11, 2008, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador publicly announced that he “had no
confidence in the World Bank arbitration branch [i.e., ICSID] that is hearing U.S. oil
company Occidental’s lawsuit against Ecuador” 25 and explained that “Ecuador handed
over its sovereignty when it signed international accords binding it to the bank’s
ICSID”.26 The expressed mistrust of ICSID in Latin America was clarified in part by
Bolivia’s explanation of its withdrawal. The arguments against ICSID included: (i)
18

The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, p.11 (Issue 2012-2)
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics
.
19

ICSID List of Pending Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (last visited Apr. 6, 2014 2:24
PM),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending.
20

See Vincentelli supra note 14, at 423-24 (citing Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Waive of Arbitration Against
Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 41, 73 (2005) (explaining that the financial crisis in 2001 and 2002 in Argentina led to dozens of
claims being filed by foreign investors against the state and led it to be the country with the most claims
filed in ICSID)).
21

See Vincentelli, supra note 14, at 419, 421.

22

ICSID News Release, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (July 9, 2009),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20.
23

Venezuela did not officially submit a notice of denunciation until 2012. ICSID News Release, INT’L
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. ( Jan. 26, 2012),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement10.
24

Cuba and Nicaragua never officially submitted a notice of denunciation under Article 71of ICSID. Id. at
421.
25

See Vincentelli, supra note 14, at 422 (citing See Gabriel Molina, Ecuador Wary of World Bank
Arbitration
in
Occidental
Case,
USA TODAY,
(MAY
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-05-11-3404362337).
26

Id.
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ICSID awards are not subject to appeal; (ii) the fact that a vast majority of ICSID awards
have been decided in favor of the private investors shows that the system lacks neutrality
and impartiality; (iii) only private companies may sue at this forum; and (iv) the cost to
litigate these claims is very high.27 The manner and impact of these denunciations are
somewhat unclear,28 but nonetheless, these actions and rationales demonstrate aggressive
manifestations of displeasure with the forum as a facilitator of fair investment dispute
resolution. Because no ICSID disputes have yet dealt with denunciation, 29 the
implications of denunciation on the party consent and status as a contracting state as
conditions for ICSID jurisdiction are unknown.30 It remains unclear whether host states
can revoke their consent to arbitrate given by BITs through an ICSID denunciation and
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the potential for investors to continue to bring
cases after the deposit of the denunciation notice or after the six month period mandated
before the denunciation comes into effect. 31 After denunciation, there is no existing
definitive standard that dictates or describes the denouncing state’s relationship with
ICSID moving forward.
Because prevailing arguments state that systemic incentives (e.g., financial gain)
push arbitrators to decide in favor of investors to maximize the popularity of investorstate proceedings and increase the likelihood of their reappointment,32 it can be said that
this lack of independence and impartiality exemplifies institutional bias. Furthermore,
signatories to the ICSID convention have an obligation to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards, and, thus, awards are often considered automatic.33 Articles 53(1) of the ICSID
rules provide that an award rendered is binding and cannot be appealed unless
enforcement is stayed pursuant to ICSID provisions. 34 The perceived automatic
27

Id. at 422-23 (citing See Bolivia se va del CIADI, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 3, 2007),
http://go.worldbank. org/2L60II0X80 (explaining that these reasons are enumerated in the World Bank
press release (in Spanish) announcing Bolivia’s exit to ICSID)).
28

Wolfgang Alschner et al., Legal Basis and Effect of Denunciation Under International Investment
Agreements (May 9, 2910) (unpublished research paper, The Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies) (on file with The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies).
29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629,
651 (2009).
33

James W. Barratt and Margarita N Michael, The ‘Automatic’ Enforcement of ICSID Awards: The
Elephant in the Room, THE EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN ARBITRATION REVIEW, (2014),
available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/58/sections/202/chapters/2274/the-automaticenforcement-icsid-awards-elephant-room/ (This article sheds light on the current discussion that ICSID
awards may not be technically ‘automatic’ because the procedure of enforcement is governed by the laws
of the country in which the enforcement is sought. Article summaries go in parentheticals).
34

See id (explaining ICSID Article 53(1)).
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enforcement as pertaining to members of ICSID may be seen to developing nations as
another procedural disadvantage. In the event states believe an award to be unjust,
developing nations cannot turn to an appeal process to remedy the matter.
Because ICSID as a forum does not have a system of precedents or a formal law
of foreign direct investment much of the alleged bias asserted above manifests itself at
the individual arbitrator level. Scholarship discussing Latin American participation in
ICSID suggests that the lack of arbitrator independence and impartiality is viewed by
Latin American states as an institutional bias and has been a point of contention regarding
international investment arbitration.35
III.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATORS AS NEUTRALS

Neutrality is vital for effective adjudication. Although an absolute standard of
neutrality has been repeatedly held as a desirable and defining standard for adjudicators,36
35

One of the greatest criticisms of investment arbitration is the impartiality of arbitrators. Critics believe
that arbitrators produce decisions reflecting their own ideologies and personal self-interests and in a way to
maximize their likelihood of future appointments. Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International
Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 217, 219 (2013). Another criticism voiced is that
investment arbitrators favor investments over state interests in order to increase personal business
opportunities or because of policy preferences. Id. at 220 ((citing Cf. Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability:
Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (hypothesizing that in
domestic arbitration, by ignoring applicable mandatory rules, arbitration can “develop a reputation as a
desirable arbitrator” and thus increase their chance at future selection); This concern is echoed by many
scholars. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Powers and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 207 (2010)). In contrast, defenders argue that developing
reputations for impartiality is of a greater self-interest in the career of an arbitrator than reappointment and
that partisan bias would be counterproductive. Id. at 220-21 ((citing Charles N. Brower & Stephan W.
Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009)). However, in a 2010 study, a leading arbitrator and scholar, Albert Van den Berg,
demonstrated that nearly all dissents written by party-appointed arbitrators are written in favor of the
appointing party, which that the promotion of self-interest among arbitrators affects the neutrality of
international arbitration. See id. at 235 ((citing Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by PartyAppointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (2010)).
36

Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeus Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A
Study In the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1379 (2010) (citing See,
e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (holding that an individual detained by the government
was entitled to a neutral adjudicator “as a matter of due process of law”); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972) (concluding that due process requires “a neutral and detached judge in the first
instance”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (“While ‘[m]any controversies have raged about . . .
the Due Process Clause,’ . . . it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . , it must afford ‘notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination becomes effective.’”)
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (“That officers acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of
course, the general rule.”)) (explaining that a neutral adjudicator is an essential principle of due process in
the U.S)).; See Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International
Adjudication, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 111 (2008) (expressing that there is an intuition that
international adjudicators should not have preconceived notions on issues arising in the case). Catherine A.
Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct,
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it becomes convoluted when it is carried over to arbitration.37 Non-neutral arbitrators are
said to possess a conflict of interest and can ultimately lead to disqualification. The often
elusive concept of neutrality is further complicated in the realm of investment arbitration,
in which the pool of arbitrators is noticeably small38 and in which repeat appointments
are common.39
A. Repeat Appointments and Theories of Arbitrator Motivation
The term “repeat arbitrator” refers to an arbitrator who has been appointed by the
same company or industry group persistently.40 In international arbitration, party input in
the arbitrator selection and disqualification process allows participating parties to feel
comfortable with the legitimacy of the tribunal. 41 When party input results in the
reappointment of arbitrators, however, the legitimacy of the tribunal may be
compromised. In the context of investor-state arbitration administered by ICSID, this
practice can create the perception that the forum is an institutionally biased mechanism
designed to protect the interests of merely one side of the dispute.
Institutional bias refers to the propensity for outcomes to favor one class of
participants over another. 42 Bias is perceived to be institutional if the causes of the
uneven outcomes are widely distributed throughout the entire arbitral system. 43 When
looking at ICSID disputes, outcomes suggest that arbitrators favor claimant-investors in
order to promote their own reappointment. 44 An opposite tendency would arguably
diminish the attractiveness of ICSID arbitration in the eyes of investors, decreasing its
41 STAN. J INT’L L. 53, 56 (2005) (citing John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 237 (1987)) (explaining that impartiality is a defining feature of a judge.
37

See Rogers, supra note 36, at 56.

38

See Margaret Moses, Reasoned Decisions in Arbitrator Challenges 6 (UNIV. OF CHI. SCH. OF L., Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Research Paper, No. 2012-011), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114551.
39

See Chiara Giorgetti, Challenges of Arbitrators in International Disputes: Two Tribunals Reject the
“Appearance of Bias” Standard, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jun. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/20/challenges-arbitrators-international-disputes-twotribunals-reject-#_edn32.
40

See Park, supra note 32, at 653 (citing see generally Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, The Rising Issue of “Repeat
Arbitrators”: A Call for Clarification, 25 ARB. INT’L 103 (2009)).
41

See Trakman, supra note 13, at 659.

42

See Roger J. Peristadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1983,
1985-86 (2002).
43

Id. at 1986.

44

See Park, supra note 32, at 658 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW, 175-84 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007)).
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usage as an adjudicatory process. Creating an overall investor-friendly forum remains
more lucrative for arbitrators because it increases the overall number of disputes they can
potentially adjudicate in the future. This proves to be particularly true in the case of
ICSID, a World Bank affiliate. 45 One scholar suggests, “as merchants of adjudicative
services, arbitrators have a financial stake in furthering [arbitration’s] appeal to
claimants” that can lead to an “apprehension of bias in favour of allowing claims and
awarding damages against governments.”46
B. The Standard of Neutrality in Arbitration – Conflict of Interest
According to scholarly analysis of the concept of neutrality, conflicts of interest
can be classified as either: 1) lack of independence; or 2) arbitrator impartiality.47 The
former contemplates improper connections an arbitrator may have to the dispute. Some
examples include financial relationships with an adjudicating party, or personal financial
interests in the underlying investment.48 Arbitrator impartiality contemplates arbitrators’
preconceived notions that could threaten the neutrality of the arbitral process. Examples
include biases toward favored nations, prior unrelated relationships with one or both
parties, or other personal biases that could inspire party favoritism by an arbitrator. For
international arbitration to function as a trusted form of investment adjudication, it is
essential that international arbitrators remain both independent and impartial.49 Appointed
arbitrators should not have any economic or emotional links to the dispute. 50 One
commentator notes that, “Although few people are free of predispositions in an absolute
sense, some will prove relatively more detached than others with respect to any given
dispute”. 51 While helpful in articulating a mission of equity and fairness in ICSID
arbitration, clear definitions of independence and impartiality remain evasive.
Accordingly, it will prove valuable to future proceedings to clearly define the amount of
acceptable bias allowable to still render arbitrators independent and impartial, and will

45

See id. at 653-8 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, 152-3,
16 ( Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing that the counterargument to arbitrators seeking repeat
appointment is that such action is counterintuitive and would in fact decrease the chance of reappointment
by tarnishing their reputation as an unbiased adjudicator. Further, some believe there is a stronger incentive
for arbitrators to safeguard their professional status as neutral adjudicators and be respected among peers).
46

Id. at 651 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, 152-53
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007)).
47

48

Id.at 636 .
See id.

49

See Park, supra note 44, at 637.

50

See id.

51

Id. at 632.
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instill confidence in developing nations that the arbitral process is a fair form of
adjudication.52
C. The Duty to Disclose
Another key question that remains is to what extent an arbitrator must disclose
past, present, and potential conflicts of interest and the consequences of failing to
disclose these possible conflicts of interest.53 As noted in scholarly commentary on the
topic, there is a notion that arbitrators are less impartial than judges due to several factors
including that arbitrators in identifying a conflict of interest, are often required to act
contrary to their own financial interest, and the ability of parties to select arbitrators that
serve party interests. 54 Disclosure of disqualifying relationships is particularly suspect
when arbitrators are given the task of self-diagnosing a conflict of interest because at
times, disclosure of a conflict of interest can cost an arbitrator hundreds of thousands of
dollars in relinquished fees.55 However, the decision of whether to disclose is extremely
important in the arbitration proceedings because failure to do so can lead to nullification
or non-enforcement.56
Subject to some variation, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International
Arbitration, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules all prescribe a duty, at the
outset and throughout the proceeding, to disclose “any facts or circumstances which
might be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes
of the parties,” or if “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubt’s as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.” 57 Furthermore, in these forums, arbitrator
reappointment in two or more related cases raises questions about the arbitrator’s
independence, especially where prior cases exposed the arbitrator to privileged
information that could prejudice an arbitrating party.58
ICSID provides for a less detailed duty to disclose in its rules. Under Rule 6(2)
52

See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 362 (2002).
53

David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures: Are we Making a Mountain out of a
Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879, 880 (2008).
54

See Rogers, supra note 36, at 71-74.

55

See id. at 72.

56

Id.

57

Piero Bernardini, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, THE INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL
FOR
COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
(Nov.
2,
2011),
http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf (citing The London Court of
International Arbitration, Rules, art. 10.3; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Arbitration Rules, art, 10; The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules, art. 14(2)).
58

See Bernardini, supra note 57.
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each arbitrator is required to produce a declaration, stating that he or she has disclosed:
… (a) my past and present professional, business and other
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other
circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent
judgment to be questioned by a party. I acknowledge that by
signing this declaration, I assume a continuing obligation promptly
to notify the Secretary-General of the Centre of any such
relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises during this
proceeding.59
Article 13(2) of the Additional Facility Rules60 calls for similar actions, but uses even
broader language, stating that an arbitrator shall sign “a statement of my past and present
professional, business or other relevant relationships (in any) with the parties is attached
hereto.” Both of these provisions fail to elaborate on the types of relationships that would
affect the arbitrator’s “independent judgment” and are especially silent on whether repeat
appointments would run afoul of the intent of the disclosure requirement.
IV.

THE CURRENT STATE
DISQUALIFICATION

OF

THE ICSID PROCESS

ON

ARBITRATOR SELECTION

AND

ICSID’S arbitrator selection and disqualification processes are wrought with
deficiencies that convolute the duties of arbitrators and disputing parties when issues of
arbitrator independence and impartiality arise.
Because so few arbitrator
disqualifications have been fully adjudicated, the standards for arbitrator qualifications
enumerated in the rules are left vague and unclear due to the lack of application or
guidance.
A. The Arbitrator Selection Process
The composition of the Tribunal is described in Convention Article 37 (2) (a),
which sets forth that “the Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number
of arbitrators as the parties shall agree.” 61 Under this, freedom of party contract will
dictate the selection process unless none exists, in which case Article 37 (2) (b) will
preside. Article 37(2)(b) states, “ Where the parties do not agree upon the number of
arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three
arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the
59

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter “ICSID”), Rules of
Procedure For Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter “Arbitration Rules”), and Regulations, R. 6(2), Apr.
2006.
60

ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, art. 13(2), Jan. 2003.

61

ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States And Nationals of Other
States (hereinafter “Convention”), art. 37 (2)(a).
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president of the Tribunal, appointed by the agreement of the parties.”62 The appointment
of arbitrators under Article 37 (2)(b) is dictated by Rule 3 of the Arbitration Rules of
ICSID that states either party in communication to the other party shall:
…name two persons, identifying one of them, who shall not have
the same nationality as nor be a national of either party, as the
arbitrator appointed by it, and the other as the arbitrator proposed
to be the President of the Tribunal; and invite the other party to
concur in the appointment of the arbitrator proposed to be the
President of the Tribunal and to appoint another arbitrator.63
In response, the other party must reply with the name of their choice of arbitrator
appointment, and also must either concur in the appointment of the arbitrator proposed to
be the President of the Tribunal or offer an alternative person for this role. 64 If an
alternative is offered, the initiating party shall also notify the replying party of whether it
concurs in the appointment of the alternative proposal of President of the Tribunal. 65 In
the event that ninety days or another agreed upon length of time passes after the dispatch
from the Secretary-General of the notice of the registration and the Tribunal is still not
completely formed, either party may request that the Chairman complete the appointment
process by selecting the remaining arbitrators and designating one to be President of the
Tribunal.66
During the appointment process, parties are responsible for selecting adjudicators
that exhibit certain characteristics. Article 14(1) establishes the criteria for arbitrators on
ICSID tribunals:
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of
Arbitration. 67
Despite the assertion that arbitrators must exercise independent judgment, the term
“independent,” is largely left undefined in the context of Article 14(1). Increased
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See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, at r. 3(1)(a).
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accountability in arbitration will contribute to a perception of legitimacy by clarifying to
arbitrators and parties alike what type of conduct is acceptable an unacceptable and thus,
can aide in correcting some of the limitations set in the ICSID rules.68
B. The Arbitrator Disqualification Process
The standard for arbitrator disqualification is provided in Article 57 of the ICSID
Rules, which states:
A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the
disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact
indicating a manifest69 lack of the qualities required by paragraph
(1) of Article 14. A party to arbitration proceedings, may, in
addition, propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground
that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal under
Section 2 of Chapter IV.70
Relying on Article 14(1), as referred to previously, the disqualification process fails to
develop identifiable characteristics of arbitrators that will lead to disqualification.
Article 58 then lays out the process of review of the proposal:
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or
arbitrator shall be taken by the other members of the Commission
or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members
are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole
conciliator or arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or
arbitrators, the Chairman71 shall take that decision. If it is decided
68

See Rogers, supra note 36, at 72.
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Multiple decisions have concluded that manifest is defined as “evident” or “obvious.” Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona SA. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Cases Nos. ARB/03/17 and
ARB/03/19,, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶ 34
(October 22, 2007); Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Decision on
Respondent's Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator Dr. Yoram Turbowicz, ¶ 37 (March 19, 2010); Universal
Compression International Holdings, S.L.U v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/9, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Prof. Brigitte Stern and Prof. Guido Santiago Tawil, ¶
71 (May 20, 2011); Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/13, Decision on Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini from the Tribunal
under Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, ¶ 59 (February 27, 2013),
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that the proposal is well-founded, the conciliator or arbitrator to
whom the decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or section 2 of Chapter IV.72
Interpretation of Article 14(1) and its application to the challenged arbitrator is initially
assigned to the members of the panel not in question, who must determine if the
arbitrator’s conduct or relationships reach that standard of apparent bias. 73 As stated
above, in the event that the Tribunal cannot reach consensus in deciding on the proposal
for disqualification, the decision shall be reserved for the Chairman. Past studies have
shown that arbitrators are often reluctant to disqualify colleagues, 74 and more often than
not, the decision then gets pushed to the Chairman in a majority of cases.75
Because disqualification goes first to the remaining members of the Tribunal,
followed by potential deference to the Chairman, this procedure can lengthen the process
of adjudication. This peculiar procedure, not present in non-ICSID disqualifications of
arbitrators, creates a system within ICSID that makes it difficult and time consuming to
disqualify arbitrators.76 However, the rules emphasize that this portion of the adjudication
is to be handled efficiently. Pursuant to Article 15 in the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules77 and Rule 9 of ICSID’s Rules of Arbitration,78 a proposal for disqualification of an
arbitrator shall be made promptly and before the proceeding is declared closed.79 After
the proposal is filed with the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General must transmit the
proposal to the Tribunal and the Chairman if necessary, and notify the other party of the
proposal.80 The accused arbitrator may without delay submit explanations to the Tribunal
or Chairman. In the event that the Chairman has to decide on a proposal to disqualify, he
72

See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, at art. 58.
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must use his best efforts to take that decision within 30 days. 81 However, in the event that
the Chairman exceeds the 30–day recommendation, ICSID does not provide for any
safeguards to move the process forward. Article 15(7) firmly states that the proceeding
shall be suspended until a decision has been taken on the proposal. 82
C. The Process of Filling Vacancies.
In the case of the disqualification, death, incapacity or resignation of an arbitrator,
Rule 11(1) provides the process for filling the resulting vacancy:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), a vacancy resulting from the
disqualification, death, incapacity or resignation of an arbitrator
shall be promptly filled by the same method by which his
appointment had been made.83
Paragraph 2 provides that the Chairman shall appoint a person from the Panel of
Arbitrators:
(a) to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation, without consent of
the Tribunal, of an arbitrator appointed by a party; or (b) at the
request of either party, to fill any other vacancy, if no new
appointment is made and accepted within 45 days of the
notification of the vacancy by the Secretary-General.84
Under R 11(1), the disqualification of an arbitrator will thus result in allowing the
appointing party to fill the vacancy. At this stage, the appointing party might be inclined
to choose a new arbitrator that is more impartial or independent, but will still have the
strong incentive to appoint an arbitrator that will serve party needs with regards to subject
matter expertise or favorable perspective of the law. Therefore, disqualification alone
does not provide an assurance of a more-neutral replacement.
D. Statistics on Arbitrator Disqualification
Collected figures reveal the infrequency of arbitrator disqualification. The
success rate for arbitrator challenges in ICSID currently hovers around a meager three
percent. 85 From the early 1980’s through 2011, there have been a total of forty-two
81
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453

challenges, nine of which resulted in resignation by the implicated arbitrators.86 ICSID’s
case statistics do not provide for a statistical break down of resignations,
disqualifications, and proposals for disqualification that are overruled. Because
publication of disqualifications is optional and needs consent from all parties, statistics
arising from these decisions is limited and provide little guidance. Furthermore, even if a
complete set of data existed regarding the limited decisions on disqualifications, the
miniscule sample size would restrict the formation of reliable conclusions.
Whether these numbers demonstrate success or failure is illusive due to the reappointment process described previously. In all but one scenario, both arbitrator
resignations and disqualifications give the party that originally appointed that arbitrator
another opportunity to select an arbitrator for the tribunal, as discussed in Article 11(1).
The only situation in which that right would be taken from the appointing party is
enumerated in ICSID rule 8(2) 87 and Article 14(3) of the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, 88 which state that, when the arbitrator resigned without the consent of the
continuing members of the Panel, the Chairman is delegated the task of filling the
vacancy. 89 In every case but one, Victor Pey v. Chile, the tribunal consented to the
resignation. 90 Therefore, in eight out of the nine resignations, the original appointing
authority was able to appoint an arbitrator of their choosing to fill the vacancy. Because
resignation absent consent is rare, neutrality of arbitrators is still questionable in the
majority of cases in which resignation has occurred. Until 2011, twenty-nine challenges
were rejected, and three challenges did not go forward.91 Ultimately, only one resulted in
disqualification.92
E. Payment Process
The process for payment of arbitrator fees under ICSID may encourage
arbitrators to both fail to disclose conflicts of interest and decide in favor of investors in
order to maximize potential earnings. The evident self-interest created through the
86
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payment process further frustrates the goal of setting standards of independence and
impartiality by creating a system in which arbitrators are motivated to conceal their lack
of neutrality.
Article 60 of the Convention establishes that “Each Commission and each
Tribunal shall determine the fees and expenses of its members within limits established
from time to time by the Administrative Council and after consultation with the
Secretary-General.” 93 In addition to allowing for a changeable calculation of fees for
arbitrators, Article 60 also upholds freedom of contract in allowing party agreements in
advance with the Commission or Tribunal about fees and expenses of its members. 94
Party agreements on the calculation of fees for arbitrators will supersede ICSID
regulations on the same matter. In the event that parties do not have a controlling
agreement on the calculation of fees, Regulation 14 of the Financial Provisions listed
under the Administrative and Financial Regulations provides that members of a Tribunal
shall receive fees, allowances, and travel expenses as determined by the SecretaryGeneral with the approval of the Chairman. 95 The members of the Tribunal are
compensated by the Centre, and not by individual parties.96 Even though arbitrators will
get compensated for their provided services no matter the outcome of a specific dispute,
siding with investors will increase the potential for reappointment in the future by making
ICSID a more attractive forum to foreign investors.
F. Potential Effects
Increased accountability and the clarification of standards of independence and
impartiality will contribute to a perception of legitimacy by dictating to arbitrators and
parties alike what type of conduct is acceptable and unacceptable and thus, can aid in
correcting some of the limitations of the ICSID rules.97 One of the major limitations of
ICSID rules is the vague standards set forth previously in Rule 14 that fails to define what
constitutes “independence,” which makes it difficult both for parties to identify
adjudicators who meet this qualification, and for arbitrators to know what circumstances
mandate a duty to disclose. Furthermore, the disqualification process complicates the
removal of unfit arbitrators by lengthening the arbitration proceedings and reducing both
the efficiency of utilizing ICSID to adjudicate international disputes thereby decreasing
the attractiveness of international investment arbitration in general. Even after a
successful disqualified, as seen in Rule 11, allows for appointment of the replacement by
the same original method and, thus, does not ensure more independent or impartial
93
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adjudicators. The infrequency of arbitrator disqualification and low success rate warrants
a discussion not only of the procedure’s efficacy, 98 but also demonstrates that ICSID
should amend its process to challenge arbitrators in order to fulfill the overall goal of
maintaining the integrity and fairness of arbitration as an adjudicatory process.99 In order
to promote efficiency in the adjudication process and instill confidence within Latin
American parties as to the integrity and fairness of ICSID proceedings, it is essential to
establish standards of independence, impartiality, and identify behavior that demonstrates
a manifest lack of these qualities so that parties will be able to (a) initially appoint an
impartial and independent arbitrator and (b) in filling vacancies on the Tribunal, appoint
an impartial and independent replacement so as not to extend the length of the
proceedings and risk further disqualifications and (c) have confidence that arbitrators
exhibiting partiality or dependence will be held accountable.
IV.

RECENT DISQUALIFICATIONS
A. Blue Bank v. Venezuela

On June 25, 2012, Blue Bank International & Trust (hereinafter “Blue Bank”)
filed a request for ICSID arbitration against the Venezuela. 100 Blue Bank alleged that
Venezuela breached the 1994 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (the “Agreement”), a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) between Barbados
and Venezuela. 101 On October 8, 2012, Blue Bank appointed Mr. José María Alonso
(hereinafter “Alonso”) as its arbitrator. 102 Venezuela, in turn, appointed Dr. Santiago
Torres Bernárdez (hereinafter “Bernárdez”) from Spain as its arbitrator.103
Venezuela submitted a proposal to disqualify Alonso under Article 57 of the
ICSID Arbitration Rules.104 Although Blue Bank also submitted a proposal to disqualify
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Bernárdez as an arbitrator,105 Bernárdez submitted his resignation from the tribunal and
thus, the Chairman did not analyze the proposal to dismiss Bernárdez. 106
Venezuela opposed the appointment of Alonso due to his position at Baker &
McKenzie, a firm that represented Blue Bank in Longreef Investments A.V.V v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.107 Venezuela further asserted that Alonso is a member
of international committees within his firm, and that part of his compensation depended
on the global returns of the firm.108 In Venezuela’s view, these facts established a direct
and indirect economic interest in the outcome of the case, giving rise to reasonable
doubts regarding Alonso’s independence and impartiality.109
In response, Blue Bank stated that Venezuela mischaracterized the facts and legal
standard by incorrectly describing Alonso’s role in the firm’s International Arbitration
Steering Committee. 110 Blue Bank believed that Venezuela had not proved a manifest
lack of impartiality or independence, and more specifically that the standard established
by the term “manifest” was not met.111 Thus, Blue Bank requested that the proposal to
disqualify Alonso be denied.112
Alonso’s argument was threefold. First, he argued that the Baker & McKenzie
offices representing Longreef–located in New York and Caracas–are independently
functioning legal entities that function separately from Alonso’s office. Accordingly,
Alonso’s association with a single Baker & McKenzie office would not create conflicts
with clients of other offices.113 Second, Alonso asserted that he did not lead the global
arbitration practice at Baker & McKenzie, and thus, his participation in the International
Arbitration Steering Committee did not meet the standard for disqualification under the
ICSID convention.114 Third, Alonso offered that his income as a partner of the Madrid
office depends solely on the profit derived at that office and not on the financial situation
105
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at the New York and Caracas offices. 115 Accordingly, Alonso concluded that the
Chairman had no basis to find reasonable doubt as to his impartiality because he did not
and had never personally represented either of the parties, had never acted against the
respondent, and he had no economic or other interest in the result of Longreef.116 The
motion for disqualifications brought by Venezuela alleged a manifest lack of the qualities
required by paragraph (1) of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention.117
The Chairman’s analysis of the party arguments notes an inconsistency between
the English and Spanish versions of Article 14, in which the English version refers to
“independent judgment,” while the Spanish version requires “imparcialidad de juicio
(impartiality of judgment).” 118 Because both versions are considered authentic, the
accepted view is that arbitrators must be both impartial and independent.119
The Chairman stated that “Impartiality refers to the absence of bias or
predisposition towards a party” and that “independence is characterized by the absence of
external control.” 120 Both independence and impartiality “protect parties against
arbitrators being influenced by factors other than those related to the merits of the
case.”121 Furthermore, Article 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID convention do not require proof
of actual dependence or bias, but only require the appearance of dependence or bias for
disqualification actions to be appropriate. 122 The Chairman asserted that the only
guidelines that bind him or her are those of the ICSID and others, such as the IBA
guidelines, may be useful references. The decision he makes can only be according to
Articles 57 and 58 as set forth by ICSID.123
In analyzing the proposal to disqualify Alonso, the Chairman found significant
that Alonso’s compensation from the International Arbitration Steering Committee relied
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primarily, but not exclusively, on the financial performance of the Madrid office. 124
According to the Chairman, the fact that even a small part of Alonso’s compensation was
contingent on factors other than the performance of the Madrid office was enough to
trigger a conflict with the Longreef adjudication.125 Moreover, the Chairman concluded
that the Blue Bank adjudication would likely present substantively similar issues to those
arising in Longreef, which would present additional conflicts under the ICSID rules.126
Therefore, the Chairman disqualified Alonso under Articles 14(1) of the ICSID
Convention.127
B. Implications of Blue Bank
Even though Chairman’s disqualification of Alonso was based on his speculation
about a lack of independence and theoretical impartiality, his reasoning marks the initial
steps in formulating a comprehensible standard for conflicts of interest that render an
adjudicator partial under ICSID. It also begins to establish a standard for when an
arbitrator has a duty to disclose such conflicts. Under the Chairman’s analysis, an
arbitrator’s financial ties, however tentative and indirect, to a firm that has a prior
relationship with the claimant-investor, can create a conflict of interest, and demonstrates
that the adjudicator in question lacks the necessary qualities of independence and
impartiality as established in Rule 14, quoted beforehand. Additionally, as previously
referred to in Rule 6, Alonso had a duty to disclose any relationship or circumstance in
which the reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by a party. Accordingly,
even though not specified by the Chairman in the Blue Bank decision, Alonso should
have disclosed his full relationship with Baker & McKenzie.
Although the Chairman’s decision on the proposal for disqualification in Blue
Bank is a crucial first-step in establishing which financial and professional relationships
can negate the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and render the appointment of
such arbitrators inappropriate under ICSID, the Chairman’s analysis is underdeveloped.
It is not uncommon for arbitrators to have past or current careers with law firms. Without
the Chairman’s ability or willingness to adequately show how Alonso’s position at Baker
& McKenzie and ties to Longreef cause him to be partial in the current proceedings raises
question as to the existence of actual bias. The tentative relationship established between
Alonso and Baker & McKenzie, is one that is a common occurrence in the world of
arbitration and deeming such relationships, as automatically constituting partiality may
be unreasonable for the successful future of international arbitration. Clear and defined
standards of independence and impartiality would be valuable to ICSID as an institution
in order to promote the neutrality of adjudicators, encourage the efficiency of arbitration
124
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proceedings, and make arbitration attractive to investors and state alike. Thus, it remains
unclear as to why the Chairman in Blue Bank failed to offer adequate evidence or reason
as to why Alonso’s relationship with Baker & McKenzie implied that Alonso was a
partial adjudicator in these arbitral proceedings.
C. Burlington Resources v. Ecuador
In Burlington Resources v. Ecuador, Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña
(hereinafter “Vicuña”), a Chilean attorney, was disqualified from an ICSID panel
adjudicating a dispute between Burlington Resources and Ecuador. 128 Vicuña was
appointed by Burlington Resources, the claimant, who was represented by the law firm
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (hereinafter “Freshfields”). 129 During the course of
proceedings, Vicuña issued a dissenting opinion130 to a jurisdictional decision rendered in
January 2010 131 and a dissenting opinion on the “Decision on Liability” 132 in March
2011. On July 8, 2013, counsel for Ecuador contacted Vicuña concerning news reports
suggesting that Vicuña had been appointed by Freshfields’ clients to arbitrate multiple
disputes, at least one of which included a separate attempt by an arbitrating party to
disqualify Vicuña as a repeat arbitrator. 133 Dechert Paris asked Vicuña to disclose all
cases in which he had been appointed by Freshfields, and all assets and compensation
received after submitting the requisite disclosures under ICSID Arbitration Rule 6.134 On
July 24, 2013, Ecuador motioned for the disqualification of Vicuña. Consequently, the
arbitration proceedings were suspended. The Tribunal failed to reach a decision on the
128
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disqualification. Accordingly, the decision was reserved for the Chairman of the
Administrative Council in accordance with Article 58 of the ICSID Convention.135
Ecuador’s disqualification proposal was based on three separate claims: 1) Vicuña
had been appointed by Freshfields in an “unacceptably high number of cases;” 136 2)
Vicuña had breached his obligation to disclose circumstances that might affect his
reliability for independent judgment;137 and 3) Vicuña had demonstrated a “blatant lack
of impartiality to the detriment of Ecuador” during the course of arbitration.138
Burlington responded alleging that Ecuador’s proposal was a dilatory measure
aimed at sabotaging the arbitral proceedings because it was not made “promptly”139 and
135
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demonstrated a “pattern of consistently dissenting from the Arbitral Tribunal’s majority on those points
decided in Ecuador’s favor” See id. at ¶¶ 30-31.
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In its analysis, the Tribunal noted that because ICSID does not define the term “promptly” or does not
specify a time period, the analysis of promptness must be made on a case by case basis. Using this method,
the Tribunal decided that Ecuador had sufficient information to file a proposal for disqualification based on
repeat appointments, non-disclosure, or the existing dissent to the 2010 Decision on Jurisdiction well
before the actual filing of the proposal and thus, the filing was not prompt and constitutes a waiver. In
contrast, Vicuña’s conduct after the July 8th letter was raised in a timely matter. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.
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failure to do so amounted to a waiver.140 Because Ecuador waited until information about
Vicuña’s involvement in Repsol v. Argentina became publically available, the
disqualification proposal was untimely and the delayed challenge amounted to a
waiver. 141 Secondly, Burlington asserted that Ecuador’s proposal threatened the due
process rights of all parties in investment arbitration to their choice of arbitrators under
the ICSID convention.142 Thirdly, Burlington argued that arbitrator reappointment is not a
per se grounds for arbitrator disqualification. 143 To disqualify an arbitrator for
reappointment, the party challenging the arbitrator’s qualifications must allege that
reappointment somehow impedes the arbitrator’s independent assessment of the
underlying dispute. Here, Burlington argued, Vicuña was not economically dependent on
Freshfields because he did not derive a significant portion of his income from his prior
appointments by Freshfields’ clients. 144 Finally, Burlington argued that upholding
Ecuador’s challenge based on repeat appointment would have a negative systemic effect
on investment arbitration, and that repeat appointments are a necessary part of the
practice for the foreseeable future.145
Vicuña claimed that he disclosed all of his Freshfields appointments in
accordance with Ecuador’s request, and believed that none of his previous or ongoing
appointments interfered with his ability to impartially adjudicate the current dispute.146
He stated that all requested information was posted on the ICSID website, and that his
actions differed in Rusoro v. Venezuela,147 a dispute arising out of an expropriation claim
140

Burlington Resources, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/05, Decision on the Proposal For Disqualification of
Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, at ¶¶ 39-40.
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Burlington Resources, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/05, Decision on the Proposal For Disqualification of
Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, at ¶ 55. Presumably, as international arbitration becomes a more
frequently utilized form of commercial adjudication, more market solutions will emerge to rectify the
problem of repeat arbitrators.
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See id. at ¶¶ 56-7.
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Vicuña disclosed his participation in Repsol during his appointment in Rusoro. His inconsistency in
disclosure was considered subject to suspicion by Ecuador.
In Repsol v. Argentina, the Chairman rejected the proposal to disqualify Vicuña. Argentina alleged
that it successful nullification of awards in CMS, Enron, and Sempra, Vicuña was biased against Argentina
and thus could not be impartial in the proceedings. Repsol S.A., and Respsol Butano S.A. v. Republic of
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38, ¶ 78 (Dec. 13, 2013)(English translation by author). However, the
Chairman noted that those decisions were based on different facts, different laws and occurred at different
times than the present case. The successful exercise of their right to propose disqualification under Article
52 of the convention does not necessarily mean that Vicuña lacks impartiality in the present case and that
his references to a publication of a third party does not demonstrate a manifest impartiality against
Argentina as required by Article 57. See id, at ¶¶ 78-79. Furthermore, the Chairman concluded that
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by a Canadian miner, because Rusoro requested a list of all his appointments.148 In sum,
Vicuña rejected Ecuador’s claims of partiality during the course of arbitration.149
In ruling on Vicuña’s arbitral eligibility, the Chairman of the Administrative
Counsel, like the tribunal chair in Blue Bank, noted that proof of actual dependence or
bias is not necessary; it is sufficient to establish the appearance of dependence or bias.150
According to the Chairman, whether a prior relationship between a challenged arbitrator
and an adjudicating party constitutes the appearance of bias is an “objective standard
based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence by a third party.” 151 The subjective
belief of the party requesting the disqualification is not enough to satisfy the requirements
of the Convention.152 The Chairman also noted that “manifest lack of the [Article 14(1)]
qualities,” is defined as meaning “evident” or “obvious.”153
Applying Article 57 and 14(1), the Chairman laid out the three grounds for the
possible disqualification of Vicuña: 1) Vicuña’s repeat appointments as arbitrator by
Freshfields; 2) Vicuña’s non-disclosure of these appointments in prior to this case; and 3)
Vicuña’s conduct as an arbitrator in the Burlington Resources adjudication, particularly
his dissenting opinions to the 2010 Decision on Jurisdiction and 2012 Decision on
Liability, and his conduct during the pre-hearing telephone conference.154 The Chairman
determined that Ecuador had knowledge of Vicuña’s repeat appointments and dissenting
opinions well before filing the proposal for disqualification. Accordingly, these claims
were untimely, and Ecuador had waived its right to address them before the Tribunal. 155
Vicuña’s conduct after being confronted with non-disclosure of reappointment, however,
was both timely and sufficient to challenge his qualifications. 156 The Chairman also
found that a reasonable third party conducting an evidentiary review of the matter would
conclude that Vicuña’s conduct demonstrated an appearance of impartiality warranting

Vicuña’s ties to the Pinochet regime were unrelated to the case and not sufficient to show a clear lack of
authority required by Article 14 (1). Id.
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disqualification under ICSID Articles 14(1).157 Furthermore, based off of a reasonable
evaluation of the July 31, 2013 explanations the Chairman concluded that a third party
would conclude that Vicuña’s allegations into the ethics of counsel for Ecuador
demonstrated an appearance of a lack of impartiality with respect to Ecuador and its
counsel. 158 Accordingly, the Chairman upheld Ecuador’s proposal to disqualify
Vicuña.159
D. Implications of Burlington
At first glance, the Chairman’s dismissal of Ecuador’s arguments that Vicuña
should be disqualified due to his repeat appointments and dissenting opinions seem to
offer little guidance on the establishment of more clear standards for disqualification.
The sheer recognition of these proposals as potentially being appropriate means for
disqualification, however, has important implications for ICSID proceedings moving
forward. Undoubtedly, the Chairman’s analyses of the claims of lack of independence
and impartiality stemming from repeat appointments and dissenting opinions would have
been extremely helpful in constructing precise guidelines that parties could have utilized
in the future to select unbiased adjudicators. Moreover, arbitrators themselves could have
utilized these guidelines to determine if they had a duty to disclose repeat appointments.
Unfortunately, the Chairman’s failure to pursue these claims in his decision signifies a
lost opportunity to explain why repeat appointments and dissenting opinions indicate a
lack of independence and impartiality. The Chairman’s unwillingness to explore these
claims may even show his own impartiality, for without establishing how Vicuña’s repeat
appointments and dissents lack independence or impartiality, the Chairman’s assertions
that these commonplace practices in international investment arbitration might be
indicative of arbitral misconduct is largely baseless. Repeat appointments and dissenting
opinions are not uncommon in arbitration. In fact, in performing their prescribed duties as
an adjudicator, arbitrators may lawfully issue dissenting opinions in pursuit of fair
adjudication. Without showing how an arbitrator’s reasoning in a dissenting opinion
reaches to the point of misconduct by revealing an obvious favoritism for or opposition
against a single party, the Chairman in Burlington would have been viewed as punishing
an arbitrator for diligently performing the duty he was appointed to execute.
The Chairman’s recognition that repeat appointments can be an appropriate
grounds for the disqualification of an arbitrator, and his disqualification of Vicuña based
of his July 31 accusations that Ecuador’s counsel was unethical, do in fact encourage
Latin American states to perceive ICSID proceedings as a fairer and more equitable
adjudicatory process. Although complete analysis is absent from the Chairman’s
decision, the disqualification sets a preliminary standard. No matter how tentative, that
certain behavior by arbitrators and repeat appointments can be deemed as constituting
dependence or partiality. Accordingly, parties may be less likely to select repeat
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arbitrators or ones likely to act inappropriately, and arbitrators will be encouraged to
disclose repeat appointments. Because arbitrators in international investment disputes are
often perceived as favoring investors, Latin America may view this development in
disqualification proceedings to note that repeat appointments can demonstrate a lack of
neutrality as an advancement in the quest to ensure and promote the appointment of truly
neutral adjudicators. Furthermore, the Chairman’s willingness to recognize new and
different grounds for disqualification demonstrates that arbitrator disqualification may be
easier to achieve in the future and enhances the accountability of the system in the eyes of
Latin America.
E. The Limits of Establishing a Standard for Independence and Impartiality
As previously asserted, creating a well-defined standard of independence and
impartiality under ICSID and clarifying when a conflict of interest exists and when an
arbitrator has a duty to disclose, may place a degree of trust in Latin American states that
tribunals constituted under ICSID remain a fair and effective way to adjudicate
international investment disputes. The Chairmen’s overlooked opportunities in both Blue
Bank and Burlington are undoubtedly a lost chance to more thoroughly shed light on the
behavior, relationships, and characteristics of arbitrators that may render them partial.
Yet, their decisions still serve as a beneficial first-step at formulating a clearer standard.
Still, the benefits of creating such a standard may be limited.
Even if standards of independence and impartiality are set, repeat arbitrators still
create an appearance of bias. In order to ensure a process that is truly neutral, ICSID may
eventually have to address this common practice. The problem is noticeably complicated
and the solution must balance the rights of parties to appoint their choice of arbitrator and
the need for the arbitral proceedings to remain neutral. Encouraging complete disclosure
by arbitrators so that parties are aware of potential bias, or setting a time period between
appointments that repeat arbitrators must wait until serving on another tribunal in order to
encourage the diversification of the existing pool or arbitrators, may be appropriate, if not
imperfect solutions. It may also prove to be more beneficial not to address the problem of
partiality of repeat arbitrators because proposed solutions may not guarantee more neutral
adjudicators, and the appearance of bias of repeat players does not necessarily equate to
actual bias. For example, in the instance that a tribunal consists of three arbitrators, the
independence and impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators may be less concerning as
long as the third arbitrator is deemed truly neutral.
Another remaining question arising from the quest to define independence and
impartiality is whether doing so will truly soothe the sentiments of distrust regarding
ICSID in Latin America. As previously noted, Latin America remains skeptical of ICSID
as a fair adjudicatory process in part because of the 19th century aggression and
colonization by the West. The past history of oppression and interference by the North in
Latin America has justifiably created tension between these regions, that continues due to
differences in economic policy, politics, and culture. These tensions may also be
affecting Latin America’s perception of ICSID. Latin America’s expressed concern that
the majority of ICSID cases being decided in favor of investors demonstrates a lack of
impartiality and neutrality in ICSID may be but a mask to hide its displeasure with
continuing to participate in arbitration proceedings that time and time again result in
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unfavorable decisions for Latin American states. It must therefore be noted that if Latin
America’s criticism of ICSID is in actuality the persistence of unfavorable decisions
rendered by tribunals against state actors, establishing a standard for independence and
impartiality may do little to urge Latin America to embrace ICSID.
F. Conclusion
The decisions on the proposals to disqualify arbitrators in Blue Bank and
Burlington Resources help to establish standards of independence and impartiality. In
Blue Bank, the Chairman recognizes that Alonso had a conflict of interest stemming from
the Longreef proceedings and accordingly, Alonso would be unable to exercise
independent judgment as mandated by Article 14. Blue Bank establishes that financial
and professional relationships may demonstrate arbitrator bias. The decision in
Burlington also creates a newfound willingness to consider repeat appointments as a basis
for disqualification. Published reasoning for these disqualifications both clarifies and
defines the standards for independence and impartiality for arbitrators. As the standards
for independence and impartiality become more evident, Latin American countries will
gain confidence in ICSID proceedings because they will be able to identify disqualifying
characteristics of arbitrators and be assured that ICSID tribunals will now be willing to
disqualify arbitrators lacking independence and impartiality. Although the recent trend in
utilizing the disqualification process helps to instill confidence within Latin America
regarding the fairness of ICSID proceedings, hopefully the clearer standards established
through recent published decisions will lead to a diminished need for the disqualification
process as parties are able to identify neutral arbitrators at the onset in order to guard the
efficiency and timeliness of the adjudication process.
V.

CONCLUSION

Latin America’s complicated past with colonization has undoubtedly shaped its
current skepticism of the fairness and neutrality of arbitration proceedings. Its history
with ICSID in particular does not assuage perceptions of bias in investment arbitration.
Instead, the unclear standards pertaining to independent judgment of arbitrators,
disclosure, and the timely process of disqualification, combined with the low number of
arbitrator disqualifications over time create a sentiment of mistrust and confusion. The
benefit of the recent spike in disqualifications of arbitrators in Latin America is that the
published decisions help create standards for independence and impartiality and show
ICSID’s willingness to disqualify arbitrators who violate such standards. Moving
forward, Latin America will hopefully gain confidence in the system because it is able to
identify relationships that require disclosure, define qualities within arbitrators that will
constitute grounds for disqualification, and see that arbitrators of both investors and
developing nations alike will be held to a uniform set of standards.
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